Guest Editorial Special Issue on Electronic Voting
I. BACKGROUND T HIS special issue provides representative samples of the excellent research being carried out in electronic voting today-in areas as diverse as statistics, usability, cryptography, formal methods in security and experimental computer security analysis. It is perhaps the first broadly defined special issue of a technical journal in this rapidly growing and important research area.
The last few years have witnessed the large-scale deployment of electronic voting systems worldwide: both optical scan voting systems and direct recording electronic (DRE) systems. The latter have drawn the most attention because of the detection, by voting researchers, of a wide variety of flaws that could be used to manipulate election outcomes. At the same time, several new voting systems, that would not have similar flaws, have been proposed, prototyped, and used in binding elections. The possibility of having an impact on deployed systems has transformed the field of voting technology research to one that is now growing rapidly, attracting researchers of various backgrounds. In this multidisciplinary special issue, we bring together several of the most interesting new results in the area.
II. THE PAPERS
We begin the special issue with two papers illustrating two different approaches to improving the integrity of elections that use optical scan equipment.
Antonyan et al. describe new audit procedures, and their implementation for elections in the state of Connecticut, U.S., on the request of the Office of the Secretary of the State.
Chaum et al. describe Scantegrity II, which will be used by Takoma Park, MD, for its municipal election in November 2009. The paper describes the use of confirmation codes for cryptographic audits of the election outcome, which can be performed by voters and election observers, and are not restricted to privileged individuals.
Fink, Sherman, and Carback describe the use of trusted platform modules (TPMs) to reduce the trusted computing base of DREs. This approach enables the early detection of threats to election integrity.
Gardner, Garera, and Rubin present a new approach by which a human, such as a poll worker, can determine whether the software on an electronic voting machine has been modified, using the time taken by the computer to respond to a challenge issued by the human. If the software is changed, differences in main and cache memory access times, or CPU clock cycle times, cause the response times to be greater. Villafiorita, Weldemariam, and Tiella describe ProVotE, an electronic voting system with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) which has been used for trials and elections in Italy. They describe the design of the user interface, the use of formal approaches for the validation of the main parts of the system, and the rigorous analysis of important procedures.
The paper on the Prêt à Voter system, by Ryan et al., presents a unified description of various versions of one of the earliest voting systems where voters do not need access to an electronic system to cast their votes, yet can be assured of verifiability and privacy.
Van de Graaf proposes a simple voting protocol that provides unconditional privacy, merging the ballot design of Prêt à Voter with unconditionally hiding commitments in the ballot processing aspects of the Punchscan voting protocol.
Benaloh et al. present a method for the efficient, universally verifiable, and coercion-resistant tallying of votes in single transferable vote elections. These types of elections, where voters rank candidates, pose unique challenges that remain among the most difficult to address.
Henry, Stinson, and Sui present a rigorous approach to determining the effectiveness of attacks, on the ThreeBallot voting system, that are based on the voter's receipt and the bulletin board.
Stark describes a method to determine whether to hand count an entire paper audit trail for an election. This method counts randomly chosen samples of ballot batches in stages, using an upper bound on the P-value of the hypothesis that the election outcome is incorrect to determine whether to proceed to the next stage or to stop the audit.
Campbell and Byrne address the important issue of ballot presentation and its impact on the voter experience. Their paper describes the results of surveys performed to determine whether straight-party voting (where voters may cast votes for a single party, in many races, with one action) causes voter confusion.
Schryen and Rich examine three large-scale government elections held on the Internet, in Estonia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, to understand their use of security technology and procedures. The paper finds that early adopters have neglected to address several security threats.
The final paper-by Bohli et al.-describes the use of an existing approach, Bingo Voting, to improve the integrity and coercion-resistance of voting systems.
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